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Gender-Based Pay Gaps:
Methodological and Policy Issues
in University Salary Studies
Myra Marx Ferree and Julia McQuillan
University of Connecticut
Abstract
Methodology is often a point of contention in gender-based salary studies. Although this debate seems at first to be merely about technical issues, it also has
an important conceptual dimension. We argue that there are two competing implicit conceptions of discrimination, one institutional and the other individual,
that underlie many such debates. We first contrast the preferred methodologies advanced by each side, the policy capturing approach and the flagging approach, and explore the theoretical meaning of their statistical models. We then
describe a practical application of both methodological approaches in one specific salary inequity study. In conclusion, we reflect on the implications of such
practical statistical choices, discuss how such models can be combined, and
make suggestions for sociologists who act as statistical experts or work with
them in gender-based salary inequity studies on their own campuses.

Over 100 studies have evaluated possible gender-based discrimination in salaries at academic institutions in the United States (Gray 1990; Haignere et al.
1996; Scott 1977). There are generally two opposing sides interested in these
discrimination studies, a faculty committee or union representing employees
that believes gender-based discrimination exists, and an administration team
that often believes none exists. A central issue for both sides involves the choice
of method for determining the existence of a possible gender-based pay difThe authors appreciate the considerable help provided by participants as well as reviewers of the article in various forms. In particular; we thank Nancy Day Adams, Mark Abrahamson, Nancy Breen, Christine Bose, Leslie Cutler, Paula England, Gloria A. Gronowicz,
Mary Casey Jacob, Timothy Killeen, Larry Pittman, Natalie Sokoloff, Wendy Soneson, Carole Turbin, Wayne Villemez, Dena Wallerson, and Sue Williams, as well as the entire Working Group on the Status of Women Faculty and the Joint Dental and Medical Councils Committee on Women’s Pay Equity. We appreciate the willingness of all the participants in this
study to be rigorously reflective and to share this process with others in the interest of improving gender equity at other institutions as well. However; the interpretations and views
expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not represent those of the administration or the committee.
Corresponding author — Myra Marx Ferree, Department of Sociology U-68, University of
Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-2068; email: ferree@uconnvm.uconn.edu
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ferential (summarized in Gray 1990). In this article, we argue that these methodological debates have an important conceptual dimension. To illustrate our
case, we draw on a salary study that was conducted at a state university medical and dental school.
This salary study, like many nationwide, came into being as a result of discussions between faculty and administration. The school’s vice president established a formal committee of women faculty and charged them with ascertaining if gender-based inequality in pay existed at this institution. Both faculty and
administration agreed from the start that the issue was inequity, or discrimination in the broad sense, whether or not it was actually illegal. The goals endorsed by both faculty and administration were to discover if there was a problem in setting pay, whether conscious or unconscious, and if so, to remedy it.
Later, disagreement arose between this committee and the administration over
several specific aspects of the study, particularly the most appropriate methodological approach for identifying the existence and nature of any such problem. We suggest that one underlying tension was between competing, largely
implicit understandings of how pay inequities arise and consequently how research should be appropriately designed to evaluate them. We refer to the two
approaches as “institutional” and “individual.”
The committee assumed a model of salary inequity that operates at the institutional level. The institutional approach conceptualizes wage discrimination
as a gender stratification process that is not only historical but also pervasive
and ongoing (Acker 1989; Clayton and Crosby 1992; Connell 1987). As a theory,
the institutional approach assumes that salary setting processes for men incumbents are the institutional norm, women having historically been excluded
from the system and thus being “added in” after the fact. Paying women less in
the same jobs was completely legal until only 30 years ago; when women were
hired in conventionally men’s occupations, their wages as a class were systematically lower. The acceptability of paying women less remains an implicit social norm. Moreover, the institutional model sees all specific salary-paying organizations as being part of a labor market that as a whole still discriminates
against women, leaving women in a less strong market position than men when
negotiating salary with their organization, which can then benefit by continuing to pay women less. An institutional model assumes that no individual prejudice or hostility by a supervisor to an individual woman employee is necessary to pay her less, systematically, than a similarly skilled and experienced
man in a comparable job (Deaux and Major 1987).
Institutional inequity is often hard to see in everyday interactions. When
something is institutionalized, it becomes part of the shared expectations about
who deserves what and who should be responsible for specific positions. These
shared expectations are eventually built into established patterns of behavior; in other words, they become institutionalized as simply the way things are
done (Benokraitis and Feagin 1995). No conspiracy or policy to pay women
less is necessary. Identifying inequities at the institutional level requires understanding the salary setting process as it is applied to men in the organization
as a whole and establishing if, when, and how women’s salaries as a group are
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systematically set differently. Addressing institutionalized inequity involves
taking proactive steps to change institutional culture and functioning.
The administration appeared to us to assume a model of inequity that operates at the individual level. This approach conceptualizes discrimination as
the result of isolated prejudiced individuals in positions to decide salaries who
deliberately choose to pay individual women less than they abstractly merit.
In the vice president’s own words, he wanted to know, “Did I have a bad actor here? And if so, I wanted to get that person out of a leadership role.” In
this conceptual schema, some percentage of the income the individual woman
has earned is being arbitrarily withheld “just because she is a woman” by an
individually prejudiced administrator or supervisor, the “bad actor” in the
above quote. To model what an individual woman “really earned” while “removing” her individual gender, this approach seeks to identify either an individual man or a group of men who are as close as possible to doing exactly
what she does in as similar a setting as can be determined. Once the comparable man or men can be found, a “true” value of her earnings can be estimated and the extent of her underpayment, if any, measured. In general, the
individual model assumes that such discrimination would be rare rather than
systematic, being a reflection of individual prejudice (the “bad actor”) rather
than of institutional functioning.
The individual approach also reflects the managerial demands on administrators. As managers, higher-level administrators can more readily identify and
sanction “bad judgment” by individual lower-level decision makers than address the impact of widespread practices within the institution. Smaller, more
internally homogeneous groups are also more comprehensible, and literally
more “manageable” to administrators who have oversight over large, complex
educational institutions. For those administrators who think of prejudice-anddiscrimination as a single phenomenon and are thus committed to an individual model at the conceptual level, to apply the institutional approach seems
to suggest that they believe all of their subordinates are sexist. To them, the
across-the-board remedy that the institutional model offers may seem like a
“bad performance review” applied indiscriminately rather than to specific “bad
actors.” As managers, they want to control decision making over issues like salary and to apportion rewards (raises) and blame (for biased decisions) selectively. They also have incentives to keep the cost of any potential salary settlement as low as possible.
There have long been debates between these two models at the conceptual
level (see, e.g., Gray 1993). Institutionalists argue for the importance of understanding sexism (and racism) in defining job queues for occupations (Reskin and Roos 1990), structuring patterns of power and influence in corporations (Cockburn 1991 ; Kanter 1977), and systematically influencing the wages
and salaries thought to be appropriate for specific jobs and classes of workers
(Acker 1989; Bielby and Baron 1986; Jacobs and Steinberg 1990). Defenders of
letting market forces alone determine salaries see discrimination merely as an
“imperfection” reflecting individuals who are prejudiced, and argue instead
that most or all systematic differences reflect real differences in market value
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between individuals’ human capital, productivity, or occupational supply and
demand (e.g., Becker 1985; Filer 1983; Polachek 1985). Neoclassical economists
often believe strongly that markets do eliminate discrimination in all but rare
instances and are theoretically committed to the individual model.
In this article, we take the conceptual debate and examine it at the level of
social statistics and show how the choice of methodology in applied work on
salary discrimination in academia reflects such theoretical positions, however
poorly articulated they may be by the contending parties (cf. Blalock 1991). In
doing so, we hope both to illuminate a struggle in which many of us, as academics, have a personal stake and to indicate the dangers and opportunities we
have when we act as statistical experts in such controversies.
In the first part of the article, we contrast the preferred methodologies advanced by each of the conceptual sides and explore the theoretical meaning of
the two statistical models in the abstract. In the second part, we describe a practical application of both methodological approaches, by providing a case study
of a salary equity study that illustrates the types of models and arguments
used. We conclude with a section that raises some broader reflections on our
experience and make practical suggestions for sociologists who are enlisted as
“statistical experts” or who listen to such experts in gender-based salary studies on their own campuses.
We offer the specific case study not as a “finding of discrimination,” but
as an illustration of a collaborative process of addressing pay inequity.1 “Discrimination” is a legal concept that is constructed by a changing constellation
of state and federal laws and judicial interpretations. Had we been faced with
the problem of advancing a statistical case through the courts, we would have
had to tailor our presentation of evidence to the legal standards of “proof.”
There are three legal standards for a finding of illegal discrimination. “Evil
motive” demands direct evidence of discriminatory intent (which has become
rare), and “disparate treatment” involves showing the application of different standards of evaluation or reward to “similarly situated” individuals. The
third, “disparate impact,” requires evidence that, although the same standard
was applied to “members of a protected class” (those groups named in and
covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or another relevant piece of specific legislation) as to others, the impact of the standard used was disproportionately negative for members of the protected class and its use was not a
business necessity. These legal standards of evidence should not be confused
with deeper theoretical understandings of the operation of the processes that
give rise to such evidence. When we speak of the institutional and individual
model, we are referring to these underlying theoretical conceptualizations, not
the evidence that courts might consider relevant to each legal standard. What
the courts might see as disparate treatment by the organization as a whole
(and respond to women as a group in a class-action suit) would be conceptualized here as an institutional model, while the adherents of the individual
model would see disparate treatment only in the form of discriminatory outcomes concentrated among certain individuals within the organization (not a
class as a whole).
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To date, U.S. appellate courts have not held that failure to pay equally for
comparable work (rather than for identical work) constitutes illegal pay discrimination (cf. England 1992, chap. 5). However, in the case we study, the state
legislature had previously passed a law providing comparable worth settlements to state employees when a joint union-management study identified pay
inequities and developed a joint plan for redressing them. Because the faculty
we study were not unionized, they did not fall directly under the provisions of
the law, but both faculty and administration to some degree used the earlier
comparable worth studies and settlements with unionized employees as guidelines for what the process in this case should be. The controversies that arose
when re-applying the model developed for a unionized faculty to this new setting clarified for us the differences in thinking about inequity that we are calling the institutional and individual model. These two models are, of course,
ideal types rather than rigid dichotomies. However, such underlying and implicit theory helps to explain some of the ways in which methodological disagreements are not just about statistical approaches.
The Methodological Debate
Some issues are, indeed, narrowly methodological. Multiple regression analysis is widely used for studying social inequality (see, e.g., Blalock 1991). Up to
a certain point, both sides in salary discrimination disputes agree about this
methodology: Each finds appropriate multiple regression models built on all
available data that might “legitimately” predict salary. In typical academic salary studies, the administration and the complaining faculty group jointly designate a list of factors potentially relevant to salary for which data exist, among
which are rank, department, time at the institution, and years since degree. In
this list, both sides usually agree to include rank and department but not productivity measures. These decisions put limits on the results, but they are probably necessary if the goal is to create usable models (Haignere et al. 1996; Steinberg and Haignere 1987).
Rank can be problematic as a variable. On the one hand, it is necessary to include rank in a statistical model in order to ensure that differences in pay attributable to women being more junior (in the sense of being better represented
in more recent cohorts of PhDs and thus appropriately in lower rank) are not
attributed to gender itself. On the other hand, rank and pay discrimination may
be variably related to each other. In many institutions, rank is set by different
decision makers than pay and including rank may be capturing various effects
of promotion discrimination on women: Women’s pay may be unfairly low but
not seen by the model as such if their experience and achievements go unrecognized in both promotion and pay, or women’s pay may seem to be high for
their rank if they get routine raises but are especially less likely to be promoted
to a higher rank when their age and achievements would predict promotion
(Gray 1990).2 In either case, these various effects of rank on pay by gender require a separate study of promotions, which we—like most institutions—did
not have adequate data to conduct. Because we are focused only on salary ineq-
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uity, it is appropriate to include rank. However, including rank as a variable in
the salary model produces conservative estimates of discrimination whatever
specific regression model is employed (cf. Bellas 1994).
“Productivity” is always a controversial element in such studies. The additional time, expense, and effort necessary to gather information about scholarly productivity, such as publications and research grants, is daunting in itself (and can be frequently used as an excuse for why no credible study can be
done at all). Even if full vitae were available and coded, the challenge inherent
in deciding the worth of different journals, books versus articles, and types and
amounts of grants is contentious within departments and probably not feasible
across specialties. Scholarship is also not the only type of productivity that is
rewarded, and measures of teaching and service contributions are also poorly
developed. Pilot studies by Gray and Scott (1980) on salary data suggest that
the variables already typically included in the model capture much of the relationship between productivity and salary and that specific measures of productivity did not significantly improve their models. In any case, few administrations have such data quantified, making the inclusion of a variable measuring
productivity in either type of model moot.
Finally, all regression models include some sort of control for departments
or groups of departments. The size and composition of these groupings is often controversial, as we discuss below, because the grouping process inevitably demands a judgment as to what academic work is “the same” or different.
Departments themselves are not homogeneous in the type of work performed
(e.g., qualitative sociology of the family or quantitative analysis of class stratification), and similar specialties may be found in more than one department
(e.g., social psychologists in both psychology and sociology departments).
Grouping into categories larger than departments is usually necessary on
pragmatic grounds, to avoid having no women at all in some categories or
ranks (making it impossible to calculate one or more coefficients). At one extreme, a comparable worth approach might argue that all faculty at an institution are doing comparable work and all groupings should be avoided lest
the number of women in a group bring down the average pay for that group.
At the other extreme, all groups might be resisted on the argument that every
individual’s job is specifically different in training and market position, making all statistical analysis a priori impossible. Other research has shown that
the percentage of women in a department may depress salaries, but its effects
as a variable also must be separated from the clustering effects that reflect
market and human capital differences between departments (Bellas 1997). Because differences between departments or other groups (such as medical specialty) are known to be due not only to the numbers of women in them, excluding all such grouping would undermine the validity of the study. The
specific nature of the groups constructed, as we will see below, reflects the
theoretical approach taken.
More than merely methodological disagreements arise in relation to the specific nature of the regression models preferred by each side. In these instances,
the statistical disagreements are reflections of more fundamental assumptions
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about the processes generating inequity. In the following sections we elaborate the methodological and theoretical positions involved in advocating each
model.

The Institutional Model
The institutional approach uses multiple regression in a way designed to
detect a pattern of salary inequity at the institution as a whole (Ferree and
Killeen, reported in Geetter 1988). The basic model is recommended by the
American Association of University Professors (Gray 1990) and is also briefly
described in Norusis (1988, 175). As we will explain below, the residuals of
this regression approach can also be used to test the plausibility of the individual model. We call this in general the “policy-capturing approach.” This policy-capturing approach uses the shared list of salary-relevant factors to construct the best-fitting regression possible to predict men’s salaries, taking the
variation of residuals around the mean to reflect the influence of unmeasured
variables (research productivity, impact as an undergraduate teacher, service
and visibility on campus, administrative favoritism, and other unmeasured
factors) on salary.3 Even with a well-fitting regression model (that is, one that
explains 70-80 percent of the variance in men’s salaries), a considerable residual in dollar terms remains evident in the distribution of individual men’s residuals around the men’s mean (which is, by the mathematics underlying regression, always zero).
When a policy-capturing regression is found that is the best-fitting and
most appropriate model for men’s salaries, the regression coefficients thus obtained are applied to the women’s data and used to predict women’s salaries.
After fitting the women to the men’s model, the means and shapes of the residuals obtained are then examined. The difference between the men’s mean
(zero) and the women’s mean (positive or negative) indicates the gap between
what women as a group are paid and what they would have if they received
the same value as the men for their salary-relevant characteristics. In the institutional model, men constitute the “norm” in male-sex-typed occupations such
as university professor. This does not mean that men’s salaries are “fair” in
some absolute sense; historically gendered processes of salary setting no doubt
inflated men’s salaries (by restricting competition, etc.) as well as suppressing
those of women. As men still constitute the bulk of the faculty (in this case,
71 percent), it makes theoretical sense from the perspective of this model to
treat them as the institutional norm.4 Reversing the regression models—fitting
men’s data to a women’s model—and comparing the resultant salary differential usefully indicates the magnitude of the interaction between membership
in the group and rates of return to members of that group (Jones and Kelley
1984). When there is no such interaction, the two models are equivalent and
would yield the same results. When the rates of return differ and implicitly one
prefers raising women’s rates of return to those typical of men, as in this case,
Jones and Kelley argue (p. 340) that fitting women to the men’s model is more
theoretically appropriate.
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The institutional understanding of gender-based discrimination identifies the salary gap found by fitting women to the men’s model as the amount
of gender-based salary discrimination between women and men and, assuming the value is negative and statistically significant, considers this the genderbased pay gap. However, if the analysis stops at this point and only looks at
the means, it may be seriously misleading. Such average differences do not tell
the whole story. As Gray (1990) argues, it is very important to carefully examine the spread of the residuals. If the assumptions of multiple regression are
met, the men’s residuals will be approximately normally distributed, spreading
evenly above and below the average in a bell-shaped curve. Women’s residuals
provide further, crucial information.
One way to examine the merits of an institutional explanation of discrimination is by examining the shape of the women’s residuals. If the average difference between men’s and women’s residuals is explained by some individual
women being grossly and unfairly underpaid—as the individual model suggests would be the case—there will be a bimodal curve, with a second “hump”
near the tail end of the negative residuals.5 Such a “hump” would represent
a cluster of women with abnormally low salaries who pull down the average
for the whole group, most of whom earn for their salary-relevant characteristics about what men do (see Figure 1). Which particular women are part of
the “cluster” that is experiencing discrimination and which women are part of
the normally expected distribution of negative residuals cannot, of course, be
deduced solely from the curve. Rather than identifying just those individual
women who have exceptionally large negative residuals as the problem cases,
however, the logic of the institutional model suggests looking for underlying
patterns that may produce this clustering: Are women in the “hump” at the
bottom, for example, disproportionately likely to be members of a certain department or school? If so, the possibility raised by the individual model that
there is a “bad actor” or prejudiced administrator setting salaries in that department should not be discounted. But the women whose salaries should then
come under closer scrutiny should also include those in that same school or department who may fall at the mean or above in the overall distribution of residuals, since they might well deserve high positive residuals on the basis of their
scholarly productivity or other unmeasured factors that were not being appropriately rewarded by the possibly prejudiced administrator. In some cases, a legitimate factor may be recognized and added to the model (for example, the interaction of having a certain type of specialty in a certain type of department)
that would eliminate the clustering effect at the bottom.
Another possible shape anomaly, one that indicates institutional discriminatory practices, would be a “glass ceiling effect” (e.g., no high-end residual
tail, or a sharply truncated one, for women). In this case, most women may be
earning about what the men’s model would predict, given their characteristics,
but the women “stars” would be receiving salaries like those of merely average
performers rather than seeing their unmeasured high level of productivity (or
other unmeasured but positively valued characteristics) translate into high residuals in salary as these do for men (see Figure 2). Again, note that the residu-
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als will not serve to identify these underpaid individual “stars,” but rather suggest the nature of the cases that merit special scrutiny or extra redress. Note
that in each case, there is a rebuttable presumption that women and men do
not systematically differ in these unmeasured characteristics; in other words,
the other side may argue back that women do constitute a disproportionately
large share of the “dead wood” in the institution (and hence belong in a clump
at the bottom) or that women simply are not found among the “stars” at all.
The residuals, however, may show neither a “negative hump” nor a “truncated top” effect, and instead indicate a consistent negative shift in the salaries
of all the women taken as a group relative to the group of men (see Figure 3).
This model most closely reflects the expectations of the institutional discrimination model. Such a systematic shift downward between the men’s and women’s distributions could only be explained by productivity factors if one assumes that across the entire range of individuals, women are less productive
than men (e.g., women “stars” are less productive than men “stars,” “average”
women less productive than “average” men, and women “dead wood” somehow even more “dead”) (Haignere et al. 1996).
While in the case of the “negative tailhump” or “truncated top” it can be
argued that the women affected by discrimination are a subset of all women
and need to be individually identified so that their distinctively depressed salaries can be raised, in the case of a “consistent downward shift” it appears that
all women are affected by institutional discrimination by an amount approximately equal to the mean residual for the women. If gender does not interact with any of the independent variables in the model, this amount should be
the same as a regression coefficient for gender in a model that pools the men’s
and women’s data. Hence, it is important to run a pooled model (combining
the men’s and women’s data) with a variable for gender and compare the regression coefficient for gender with the amount of the women’s mean residual
when the men’s model is applied to the women’s data. This comparison, between the mean residual and the regression coefficient, is a global indication
of interactions and another important clue to whether or not it is plausible that
gender-based pay gaps are different among specific groups of women. If there
is a difference, looking at possible interactions, say, between gender and rank,
should be further explored.
Assuming there is no indication of interactions in the comparison of the
pooled model with that fitting women to the men’s model and that close examination of the pattern in the residuals also indicates that gender-based inequity
is not concentrated on women of a particular type, there is strong statistical evidence that thc wage gap applies to the class “women” as a whole. The appropriate remedy would thus be an across-the-board salary adjustment that would
bring the mean residual of the women’s distribution up to that of the men (and
move the rest of the bell curve of residuals accordingly).
This type of redress seems inherently objectionable to the believers in the
model of individual discrimination and managers who focus mostly on individuals, because it applies to a class (all women) something that they believe should
be appropriately given only to “deserving individuals,” that is, the individual
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women who have been shown to be the victims of prejudiced administrators
who have not given them the salary they “really earned.” Their objections are articulated in the case they make for a “more individualized approach.
The Individual Model
The regression approach that reflects the individual model first constructs
small groups of “similarly situated” women and men, usually in the same or
similar departments, and then runs separate regressions for each such small
group. This approach either estimates separate gender coefficients for each
group or models men’s salaries first and then puts women in the regression.
Because the groups are much smaller, the standard errors are typically larger,
effects less likely to be statistically significant and the shape of the residuals
not necessarily as normal (see, e.g., Holmes-Rovner et al. 1994). We call this the
“flagging approach” because it aims to identify (“flag”) individuals rather than
patterns.6 Indeed, looking for patterns in such small sets of residuals makes little or no statistical sense.
Instead, the individual approach tests whether gender effects are significant and, if they are, then tries to estimate what an individual woman would
be earning “if she were a man” in a particular group (assuming the rest of her
characteristics, such as rank and tenure, remain unchanged), by treating her
negative residual as evidence of the extent of “underpayment.” Then only the
women with negative residuals greater than some arbitrary amount have their
individual cases examined to see if such a negative residual is warranted or
not, and only those women whose negative residuals are found to be “unjustified” by their work are slated to receive compensatory raises. One such study
of compensation equity (Holmes-Rovner et al. 1994) created cohorts of men faculty for each woman in the population, averaged salaries within each cohort,
and compared the women’s salaries with this average. They then looked for
patterns of inequity within each rank, by noting the number above 4 percent,
within 4 percent, and below 4 percent of the average for the men. They consistently found negative residuals (considered underpayment) of women, with
the exception of women full professors.
The use of multiple regression on small groups to flag individuals with
negative residuals fits with an understanding of discrimination as the result
of prejudiced individuals.7 It assumes that such cases are relatively rare and
should stand out statistically, even in regressions done with such small n’s that
only the most dramatic effects reach statistical significance. It “finds” those individual women who are not paid at the level of their peers, clearly controlling for factors other than gender, such as type of work or specialty, that might
explain differences in salaries, by looking for cases with more or less extreme
negative residuals. This approach is intuitively appealing because it is a nice fit
with how Americans generally think about salary discrimination, that is, as an
isolated occurrence happening to a few unfortunate women. Seeking out those
wronged, evaluating their situation, and remedying individual cases is a familiar approach.

20

M. M. Ferree & J. McQuillan

in

G e n d e r & S o c i e t y 12 (1998)

This approach may sometimes also rest on a different understanding of
what makes “good science.” The analysis envisioned by the individual approach is similar to the case-matching approach in medical research, It attempts to create conditions similar to true experiments by selecting cases such
that everything but the effect of interest is “the same.” This approach defines
gender as the only difference between the two “groups” or individuals, if and
when they are “matched” on all other important factors (but see Campbell
and Stanley 1963, 49, 70-71, for critiques of quasi-experimental matching designs). Since productivity differences cannot be estimated as such, administrators may decide that they can “adjust” for such factors based on their knowledge of the individuals involved. Thus, conceptually, they imagine they are
“looking at individuals” matched on particular characteristics, with “only
gender” differing between them, rather than at the institutional patterns that
gender, productivity, and other unmatched factors produce. This appeals to
a sense of how “good science” is conducted, using an experimental model to
define “science.”
In sum, using the individual model of discrimination as a conceptual framework, as administrators may be prone to do, the appropriate way to proceed is
to create several small groups considered comparable for salary purposes, interpret those women with negative residuals as underpaid, and rely on particular individuals designated as evaluators (usually administrators) personally to
judge whether the underpayment is warranted or not. Although this approach
has intuitive appeal, there are several problematic assumptions in this statistical approach.
First, no individual woman who is earning a higher-than-typical salary for
her measured characteristics is considered to be potentially underpaid, even
though she may be a “star” performer (as some of the full professors in the
Holmes-Rovner et al. study may have been). In other words, some women with
positive residuals (e.g., one standard deviation above “average”) may merit
even higher salaries (e.g., two or more standard deviations above the mean).
Unlike men, who may receive exceptionally high salaries because of their unmeasured performance characteristics, women are assumed to deserve no more
than average pay (but possibly less) than men of their cohort. As Gray and
Scott (1980, 180) argue:
If an examination may show that on a “quality” basis an individual
woman “deserves” a salary which falls below the regression line,
we must suppose—unless we assume that women are qualitatively
inferior as a class—that on a “quality” basis some women deserve
to receive salaries even further above the regression line than are
their present salaries.

By reviewing only women with negative residuals, it is impossible to identify women who have positive residuals but are underpaid given their individual, unmeasured characteristics (including productivity). These women may be
outstanding in ways that deserve even higher salaries than the men in their
group, but because they will not be flagged for review, this inequity will not be
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detected. Analyzing only women with negative residuals assumes that women
with positive residuals are “overpaid” and implies that an across-the-board
settlement is unfair because they also receive an award. In other words, the approach assumes that women cannot deserve more than the average man within
the small group in which comparisons are being made. Moreover, by focusing
attention only on the lower half of the distribution, there is a risk of confirming
possible prejudices that women are “less meritorious” generally (as the highly
meritorious women with merely average salaries are exempted from administrative scrutiny).
Second, the flagging approach confuses negative residuals in general with
“underpayment” (which then is treated as either justified or not). We know
from the assumptions of multiple regression that a normal curve of residuals, both positive and negative, is expected and appropriate. Looking at only
women with negative residuals mistakes a characteristic of the institution
(which should have a spread of salaries that reflects a spread of productivitybased and arbitrary or chance variation in salaries) for a characteristic of an
individual (defining a negative residual as a sign of a problematic underpayment). A negative residual, like a positive residual, simply indicates that the
model does not perfectly predict some salaries. Most salaries are close to accurate (most cases fall within one standard deviation from the mean) and some
are quite inaccurate (three standard deviations out in either direction). These
inaccuracies—in either direction—may well be accounted for by unmeasured
(productivity) characteristics, but unless one assumes that all women, at all performance levels, are systematically inferior to men in these unmeasured characteristics, the systematic negative shift found in the institutional model cannot
be thus explained away.
The confusion between negative residuals and underpayment is inherent
in the small-group flagging approach because its small groups do not allow
for meaningful patterns of residuals. The confusion may also arise if the “policy-capturing” regression for the institution as a whole is treated simply as
generating negative residuals that are then used to “flag” individual women
as underpaid. In the case of no discrimination, half of all women (like half of
all men) should have negative residuals. Finding an extreme negative tail or
hump pattern in the policy-capturing model is an indication of discrimination that more closely fits the individual model and should help to identify
cases and conditions associated with “excess underpayment” concentrated in
a specific subgroup, but the possibility that there are other members of that
subgroup who are not in the tail or hump but no less underpaid should not
be disregarded.
When one focuses on the negative residuals alone (only one form of inaccuracy) and treats them as indicators of “underpayment” for women, the leap to
considering them also as indicators of underpayment for men is not large. Because the individual model rests on regressions with small numbers of cases
and uses them to find “potentially underpaid” women for individual scrutiny,
two undesirable outcomes are encouraged: The women whose unmeasured
characteristics tend to make them less valuable to the institution on average
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will receive the bulk of the scrutiny (and most cases of “discrimination” will
be found to be “justified”) and men who are also receiving below-average salaries relative to their measured characteristics will be encouraged to claim they,
too, deserve salary review and compensatory payments. Having thus provoked them, the administration may feel it has little choice but to give “compensation” to these men as well, thus eliminating the possibility that raises for
women might actually mitigate the gender gap.

Summary of the Two Models
The model used for analysis (policy-capturing or flagging) is thus inextricably bound with the theory of discrimination used (institutional or individual)
and the politics of redress (across-the-board or individual awards) preferred.
As Gray and Scott (1980, 180) suggest,
If a case-by-case analysis is to be used to discover factors not taken
into account by the regression analysis, then obviously one has discounted the notion of treating the discrimination on a class basis.
… The appropriate remedy for statistically revealed discrimination is a statistical one; the regression line for women needs to be
brought up to that for men. This means raising the salary of each
woman, whether her current salary is above or below the regression line for men’s salaries.

This approach, however statistically sound, remains unpalatable to those
who refuse to consider institutional discrimination real and are committed to
a search for individual acts of discrimination. When we consider how widespread an individual understanding of discrimination is, it is not difficult to
understand why an institutional approach might be ignored or rejected. In addition, academic administrators are managers of individuals and thus want to
take the people involved into account in forming “qualitative” judgments and
to exercise discretion and control over those whom they manage. However,
given that considerable evidence suggests both types of discrimination operate in American society (see, for example, Benokraitis and Feagin 1995, for a review), it is perilous to focus only on individuals.
Given the politics of salary-setting, choosing between approaches on statistical grounds alone will not work. The methods preferred by each side reflect
their assumptions about how discrimination operates. Perhaps because most
studies of this sort are applied evaluations, less attention is focused on assumptions and theory and more on the merits of statistical techniques (Gray 1993).
However, arguing over what method should be used without addressing the
theoretical assumptions of each results in both sides talking past each other. As
we illustrate in the following case study, this conflict of perspectives is real and
consequential in applied research on salary inequity.
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Health Center Case Study
In 1992 the authors were enlisted as statistical consultants for a committee of
women faculty appointed by the administration at a university medical/dental school (hereafter, Health Center) to determine if there were gender-based
inequities in salaries.8 There had been two prior studies of women’s pay at the
Health Center over the previous decade, each of which had found substantial disparities, but both were statistically weak (primarily relying on ANOVA
models with few control variables), and neither had had a practical outcome
(Cipes 1983; Dadalt 1986). The women faculty on the main campus had won a
salary adjustment of $1,800 per woman faculty member in 1988, and the Health
Center faculty women considered that a study done with the same methodology had a good chance of being accepted as a reasonable approach for their
campus as well.9
The policy-capturing approach had been used on the main campus, and
the committee suggested that we apply the same approach to the base salaries of the Health Center faculty. The initial data were 1992 human resources
payroll data for 535 faculty, 29 percent of whom were women and 90 percent
of whom were white. Women faculty made up the majority of the instructors
(60 percent of 55), close to half of the assistant professors (41 percent of 233),
but few of the associate (15 percent of 102) or full (8 percent of 125) professors. Of 19 department heads, only 1 was a woman. Women were least likely
to be in the dental department group (4 percent of 24) and surgery (19 percent of 35), and most likely to be in pediatrics (45 percent of 53) and at off-site
locations (39 percent of 33). Of the 161 faculty in basic science departments,
28 percent were women, compared to 30 percent of the 373 faculty in clinical departments. Women were, on average, younger (41 vs. 46 years for men),
likely to have less time at the institution (6 vs. 9 years), likely to have earned
their degrees more recently (13 vs. 18 years ago), and likely to have salaried
employment at the Health Center represent a lower percentage of their time
(82 percent vs. 88 percent).
At the time the study began, the mean difference between men’s and women’s average base salaries was $28,500. By mutual agreement between the faculty committee and the administration, all clinical bonuses (analogous to
profit-sharing), research assistants and associates, medical and dental residents, visiting faculty, and “superstars” (men with salaries that were more than
six standard deviations from the mean) were excluded from the analysis. As
with the decision to include rank in the model, these constraints also tend to
make any estimates of gender-based inequities conservative (low). All base salaries as of June 26, 1992, for the 1992-1993 academic year were expressed as
12-month salaries. Because variation in salaries in such a narrow occupationalinstitutional context is much smaller and less skewed than in the general population, we concluded that converting salaries to logarithms offered more cost
in loss of ready interpretability than it was worth. All effects are thus expressed
in dollars.10
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Table 1: Policy-Capturing Model: Multiple Regression Predicting Male Faculty
Salaries, 1992
Departments

B (dollars)

SE B

Administration
22,518*
9,724
Offsite
–4,740
5,664
Community
10,880
6,260
Psychiatry
2,924
5,367
Dental clinical
12,651
7,086
Pediatric
–5,001
4,920
Diagnostics
12,955*
4,293
Basic science
5,437
5,494
Surgery
40,070*
3,619
Degrees 			
Mixed
–31,212*
13,099
Masters
–28,755*
8,712
PhD
–26,069*
4,408
Dental
–41,700*
4,928
Type 			
Basic
–27,672*
4,822
Tenure 			
Not yet
2,412
4,209
Tenured
7,994
4,139
Additional variables 			
Years at the institution
–497*
231
Time since degree
778*
392
Percentage employed
342*
47
Age
123
405
Asian
–8,351
7,232
Former administrator
33,213*
7,739
Rank 			
Associate
11,290*
3,445
Professor
27,930*
4,653
Department head
58,010*
6,940
Dean
44,412
25,331
Constant
48,482*
5,775
R2
Adjusted R2

Beta
.0709
–.0248
.0595
.0163
.0707
–.0311
.1026
.0458
.3718
–.0647
–.0967
–.2820
–.3216
–.2986
.0175
.0893
–.0794
.1820
.2170
.0270
–.0313
.1183
.1111
.3006
.2887
.0533

.764		
.75		

The comparison group for department is medicine; for degree it is M.D.; for appointment
type it is clinical; for tenure track it is in-residence; for racial/ethnic group it is white, black,
Hispanic, and other; for rank it is instructors/assistants. The dependent variable is 1992
salary.
* p < .05

The policy-capturing regression model (Table 1) gives the estimated effect
in dollars of a particular characteristic (e.g., academic degree) while controlling
for all other characteristics (e.g., rank) for men only. Gender is not included in
the regression as a variable because this approach examines gender by bringing
women into the men’s model. Variation around the mean in the men’s model is
expected; it reflects the unmeasured productivity factors that also produce le-
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Table 2. Departmental Groupings for the Original Committee Model
Variable
Pedidept

Group Name
Pediatrics

Dentdept
Dental clinical
		
Psychdpt
Psychiatry
Surgdept
All surgical
		
Medicine
Medicine
		
Diagdept
Diagnostics
		
Sciedept
Science
departments
Commdept
Community
departments
Offsite
Offsite clinical
Admindept
Administration
		
		

Departments
Pediatrics, Pediatric Module, Pediatric Dentistry, and 		
Orthodontics
Periodontics, Prosthodontics, Restorative Dentistry/
Endodontics
Psychiatry
Anesthesiology, Obstetrics/Gynecology, Oral Surgery,
Orthopaedic Surgery, surgery
Medicine, Neurology, Student Health, Travelers
Center on Aging
Laboratory Medicine, Nuclear Medicine, Oral
Diagnosis, Pathology, Radiology
Anatomy, Biochemistry, Biostructure and Function,
Microbiology, Physiology, Pharmacology
Behavioral Sciences and Community Medicine,
Community Medicine
Family Medicine, Burgdorf, CRMHC
Dental Dean, Student Affairs-Dental, Dean’s OfficeMedical, Academic Affairs-Medical, Minority
Student Affairs

Source: Gronowicz et al. (1993).

gitimate salary differences.11 The variables include department group (see below), degree, rank, tenure, type of appointment (basic science or clinical), age,
race, and present and past administrative responsibility. The coefficients from
the regression equation can be interpreted as the “worth” of various characteristics, such as department or degree.
Because there were over 40 departments on the payroll system, it was necessary to group departments for the analysis. The committee combined departments considered to have similar types of activities (see Table 2). Since the
model already directly included as variables the type of degree, clinical versus
basic science appointment, and rank, department groupings provided an additional level of information about salary setting. Theoretically this grouping
accepted broad market forces as legitimate salary setting factors, even though
markets may be biased against fields with a higher proportion of women (cf.
Bellas 1997).12
The 1992 data were flawed and each year after 1992 the data were improved
(errors were detected and corrected) and additional refinements were added.
Unfortunately, we had no way to clean the 1992 data in 1996 because over 100
people were no longer at the institution. Therefore, the model presented here is
not the best possible model, but is the historical model presented to the faculty.
It should be used as an example of how to proceed with this type of analysis,
not as providing a specific “finding.”
Once the men’s model was established, it was applied to the women’s data
to ascertain the fit using residual analysis (comparing predicted salaries to actual salaries). A model was also constructed using the women’s salary data,
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Table 3a. Example Mean Salary Information
Actual Salary
Men
Women
Difference

98,224
69,708
28,516

Salary Predicted by
Characteristics

Unexplained Difference

98,224
74,438
23,786

0
–4,731
–4,731

Mean salary, mean salary predicted by characteristics, remaining unexplained difference
between men and women’s salaries, 1992 faculty.
Table 3b. Example Residual Statistics
Minimum
Men
Predicted salary
26,738.0
Residual
-70,537.0
Standardized residual
-3.38
Total cases = 380
Women
Predicted salary
9,871
Residual
-68,881
Standardized residual
-3.2
Total cases = 155
Multiple R for women = .76 (R2 = .58)
Multiple R for men = .87 (R2 = .76)

Mean

Standard
Deviation

98,224
0
-.0002

37,356
20,761
.9993

145,113
74,438
60,594
–4,731
2.8 -.22		

30,882
20,735
0.96

Maximum
209,653.0
83,869.0
3.9

Residual statistics for men and women from the regression of men’s faculty salaries on the
salary-setting characteristics.

and then the coefficients were applied to the men’s data in order to rule out the
possibility of a negative mean residual for men (Gray 1990). The men’s residual was positive, and over $9,000. As Jones and Kelley (1984) discuss, this difference in estimate of the size of the wage gap reflects how the interaction between the effect of gender per se and the effects of gender differences in the
slopes (coefficients) for the individual variables (overall differences in rate of
return) is treated. In the case of such differences in slope, they argue, the most
appropriate model uses men as the norm.13
As Table 3 shows, when women are put in the men’s model, the average
residual for the women faculty was –$4,731. Eighty-three percent of the gross
wage difference, or $23,786, was explained by the characteristics included in
the policy-capturing model and thus treated as “legitimate.”14 The most important predictor variables included being a former administrator, rank, percentage employed, years at the institution and years since degree, type of appointment (basic or clinical), type of degree, and appointments to three of the
departments (administration, diagnostics, and surgery). The model explained
76 percent of the variation in men’s salaries (R2 = .764).15

Methodological

and

Policy Issues

in

University Salary Studies

27

Despite the systematic downward shift of –$4,731, the residuals for the
model applied to the women’s data are approximately normally distributed,
as are the men’s (although the men’s distribution is not quite normal, being
particularly narrow and tall, that is, leptokurtic). Based on the values for the
measured characteristics, only 40 percent of women earn more than predicted
and 60 percent earn less (see Figure 4). No second hump or long tail at the bottom is to be seen, providing no evidence of an especially discriminated against
group of women bringing down the average. There may be some indication
of a glass-ceiling effect, suggesting a special need for concern about high-performing women. However, there is no evidence that gender significantly interacts with the variables in the model; when the same regression is run on all of
the faculty data simultaneously and a dummy variable for gender included, the
coefficient for women faculty is essentially the same –$4,683. This method also
establishes a significance level for the effect of gender (p = .04), as Ikeda (1995)
and Hauser and Mason (1993) suggest.16
The Working Group on the Status of Women Faculty reported the results of
the study to the administration along with its recommendation that all women’s salaries be raised by $4,731. The administration challenged the study on
the basis of errors in the data and the type of analysis and pressed for an analysis of small market-based groups of faculty, with most of the same variables
controlled. The stated goal of the new analysis was to look for women who
were negative outliers (i.e., had large negative residuals) and to rectify errors
in the data. Concerns about particular women who fit the model poorly, objections to being given a solution, and unfamiliarity with the analytic strategy
added to their desire for a new approach.
A series of negotiations ensued about the appropriate variables to include in
the model, groups that should be excluded, additional data cleaning, and different clusterings of departments. The primary sticking point was the administration’s desire to identify specific women who might be “underpaid” (i.e., “flagging” particular women with negative residuals). There was no objection to
re-running the basic model with some adjustments suggested by the administration. The addition of an interaction term for individuals in the surgery department without an MD degree did improve the model. In addition, removing
various groups, such as faculty at off-site locations, made the sample more homogeneous and increased the R2. None of the changes suggested by the administration, however, reduced the average gap between men’s and women’s salaries
below –$4,000. Some of the changes increased the gap to as much as –$6,000.
The administration did not accept the committee model. Their concerns focused on the accuracy of the human resources data, the exhaustiveness and accuracy of the variables in the model, and the correct people to include in the
analysis (groups to include or exclude). They requested a type of comparative
analysis of individuals in groups and refused to accept the across-the-board
settlement. We interpret the administration’s commitment to a “flagging” approach to find possible individuals who might be unfairly underpaid as a result
of an individual understanding of discrimination. No progress on an acrossthe-board settlement was made in academic year 1992-93.
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In academic year 1993-94 the administration requested a new set of analyses to identify individual women who might have unfairly low salaries. Part
of the argument advanced for this approach was that women who are “adequately compensated” should not receive raises, and some women who are
not adequately compensated deserve more than the proposed $4,731. The administration took an active role in the continued analysis. The departmental
groupings were revised based on assumed market value criteria rather than
on the task similarity criteria used in the original model. Separate regression
models were run for each group with the explicit goal of identifying individual women who might be underpaid relative to comparable men, according
to a Holmes-Rovner et al. (1994) type model. This “searching for individuals”
approach was consistent with the individual prejudice conception of how discrimination operates, but it also reflected a laudable desire to “look closely at
the data.” By looking at faculty in groups assumed to have similar characteristics that determine pay, it was possible to directly see who was being compared to whom.17
Despite our objection to defining cases with negative residuals as underpaid individuals, with the advice and consent of the faculty committee, we
accepted the administration’s request for further analysis. Although throughout the study we were technically hired by the administration, we had primarily worked with the committee (also appointed by the administration). At
this point the administration took on a more active role. We ran the requested
regressions on the small groups of faculty and flagged women whose residuals were greater than one standard deviation below the mean (an arbitrary
cut point). Models were run for separate groups created by the administration. These were (1) basic scientists in basic departments, (2) basic scientists in
clinical departments, (3) administrators, and (4) five groups of clinical scientists in clinical departments (clustered by specialty). Table 4 provides a summary of these results. In effect, these eight groups take the place of the ten department groups in the first institution-wide analysis, but the regressions are
run on each subgroup separately, making the number of cases too small for a
meaningful analysis of the residuals. As a cross-check, after analyzing these
separate groups for women outliers, we re-ran the institutional model substituting dummy variables for these new market-based groups for the previous
task-based department group dummy variables. This approach did not improve the fit of the model (R2); when applied to 1993-94 data, it also did not
significantly reduce the size of the pay gap between men and women. This interchangeability of the statistics as such should emphasize the extent to which
the preference for a type of model reflected an underlying difference in focus
of concern: the small group approach turns attention away from looking for
patterns in the residuals and toward equating negative residuals with possible inequity. Throughout the process, the models were frequently re-estimated as individuals came and left the institution, as individual women received salary adjustments, or as new groups were considered ineligible and
were excluded, but the size of the overall gap in the institutional model remained the same.
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Table 4. Results of the Small Group Analysis (individual) Compared to the Policy-Capturing Model (institutional) with 1994 Data
Model
Basic in basic
Basic in clinical
Clinical in clinical #1
Clinical in clinical #2
Clinical in clinical #3
Clinical in clinical #4
Clinical in clinical #5
Deans/administrators
Institutional model

Men N
72
37
82
33
38
7
38
14
342

Women N

Adjusted R2

17
22
35
16
6
1
4
3
120

.82
.71
.66
.54
.35
.96
.94
.32
.75

Mean Residual
–2,836
–2,983
–3,403
–9,852
–14,783
7,377
343
–1,718
–1,052

p
.23
.43
.25
.15
.5
—
.95
.95
.64

Clinical #1: General Pediatrics, General Medicine, Neurology, Family Medicine, Psychiatry.
Clinical #2: Laboratory Medicine, Pathology, GI Medicine, Neonatology, Dermatology, Cardiology, Emergency Medicine. Clinical #3: OBGYN, general surgery, Urology, ENT, Nuclear Medicine, Radiology, Anesthesiology. Clinical #4: Neurosurgery, Orthopedics. Clinical #5: all Clinical Dentistry.

This modeling process had an interesting effect. It appeared to us that the
administration became even more familiar with the details of how salaries were
set by investigating the circumstances of women who were negative outliers in
the small groups. Low salaries in some departments for some individuals became a concern. As a result, there was a recommendation to the board of trustees that the board develop some salary-setting guidelines, “without limiting
their freedom to reward excellence and recruit and keep top scholars.” Moreover, the administration has now set up a biennial salary review to ensure that
gender-based differences do not creep back into the system. While applauding
these steps to improve gender salary equity at the institution, we continued to
emphasize the lack of concern this individual approach showed to women who
were “top scholars” and underrewarded their productivity (despite their positive residuals). As of 1997, there were some indications that even these issues
might be addressed in a follow-up study.
In June of 1994, the administration increased the women faculty’s pay
across the board by $1,000 (or a prorated equivalent for part-time workers).
This increase was announced as a sign of good faith that an institution-wide
problem “may exist.” The institutional and individual models were then reapplied to salaries after the June increases. Despite the limitations of the administration’s flagging model, primarily that underpayment was equated with
negative residuals and only women with negative residuals were reviewed, it
did generate evidence that some of the women reviewed still had salaries significantly lower than their peers. There were women who appeared grossly
underpaid when compared to men with similar characteristics and work situations. This was now considered convincing evidence of unfairness, both
by the administration and by the predominantly male faculty councils of the
medical and dental schools, which in fall 1994 set up a joint committee to con-
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tinue to improve the analysis and to monitor “progress toward resolution”
of the inequities. Additional salary awards were made to individuals in the
1994-95 academic year.
The joint council made an additional contribution to the analysis, moving it further away from the comparable worth precedent it had originally
followed. Instead of grouping departments and specialties according to assumed market values, they used published salary statistics for specialties in
order to make empirically sound market-value-based groups (described in Jacob et al. 1996). Such purely market-based groupings automatically erase any
evidence of society-wide discrimination that takes the form of underrewarding women in specialties with high proportions of women (cf. Bellas 1997).
The remaining analyses, both institutional and individual, were conducted
using these new groupings.18
The joint council salary review committee—consisting of two men and two
women representing the medical and dental schools, clinical and basic science
faculty—reported in February of 1996 that as a result of review by the administration and the committee, “28 percent of the full-time women faculty salaries were identified as outliers, reviewed, and 22 percent were adjusted. Additionally, an undetermined number of women received equity increases July 1,
1995 in addition to the cost-of-living increase received by most faculty” (Jacob
et al. 1996, 4).19 Indeed, both the institutional model and the small group analysis were conducted on newer data (1995 salary data), after both the $1,000
raise had been applied and the additional salary increases given to individual
women who were seen by the administration as underpaid. In the 1995 institutional models, after these salary adjustments were made, the gender gap is
reduced to about $1,000 and is no longer significant statistically. The small
group analyses also now showed no systematic gender bias remaining for
any group, with all t tests showing no significant differences (Table 4). However, this type of analysis, relying on negative residuals only, could not detect if any of the women with positive residuals were also underpaid, because
none were flagged for review.
Discussion
Rather than reaching a stalemate over incompatible methodologies, in this
particular case, a compromise process was found that allowed both sides to
claim victory. On the one hand, the women faculty all received at least a token award of $1,000 and some women faculty received substantial salary adjustments, which was a breakthrough after years of discontent and unsuccessful claims for change. After several years of negotiations and individual
wage adjustments, there was no longer a statistically significant difference between men’s and women’s average salaries. On the other hand, the administration succeeded in having its individualized approach to identifying pay inequity adopted, and so kept the responsibility for making any salary changes
within the discretion of the administrators themselves. Since the actual award
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amounts remained confidential, the ability of the faculty to see how arbitrary or
well-founded these decisions were was quite limited.
In some respects, both sides moved toward each other over the course of
the negotiations. While the committee and the administration continued to disagree with respect to theoretical approach (and consequently statistical models), there was considerable evidence of the administration’s increased commitment to identifying and eliminating gender-based salary inequity. The
administration took several steps to redress identified inequities, including
across-the-board compensation, individual settlements, the joint council monitoring committee, and the recommendation to the trustees regarding salary setting guidelines. The committee allowed more individuals to be excluded from
the model (e.g., those in off-site positions) and shifted gradually from taskbased to market-value-based definitions of similarity, accepting society-wide
structural arrangements that may disadvantage women.
A shared victory can be noted as well: Monitoring pay in and of itself can
promote more equity. Several of the faculty committee members provided anecdotal evidence of increased awareness of and decreased tolerance for gender differences in salaries over the four years of studies. It is also clear that
studies alone do not bring change. We suspect, but have no systematic evidence for this suspicion, that the involvement of several prominent women
faculty and their reports to both the dental and medical school faculty councils contributed more to a changing climate than the studies themselves. Major’s (1987) work on gender and entitlement suggests that making male pay
norms highly visible can produce discontent and pressure for action from
women. The steady persistence of the committee members kept the issue on
the agenda and, we suspect, contributed to the actions taken in response to
the study.
Application of the theoretical models of individual or institutional discrimination to the arguments and policy preferences of the administration and the
women’s faculty committee helped us as outside statistical experts to reach a
resolution in this case. Despite our misgivings about the theory and methods
preferred by the administration, we chose to run the administration’s models for them as well (with the full knowledge and consent of the faculty committee). At first, we were surprised that our argument for an across-the-board
settlement—that it would be fairer to the best women on the faculty—was rejected. Ultimately, we imputed this resistance to both the administration’s tacit
view of discrimination as an individual process and their desire to keep salary
information and decisions in their own hands. We concluded that if adequately
rewarding all women, including the ones who are “twice as good as men,” demands rethinking basic institutional practices, many administrators may be unwilling to consider such a change. As Gray (1990) suggests, people who use statistics cannot always “hear what statistics have to tell.”
Our experience in this particular case study of salary inequity, as well as our
general analysis of the competing models of discrimination likely to be held
by each side, leads us to some general conclusions and caveats about the pro-
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cess of analyzing discrimination with the goal of making and supporting sound
claims for gender-based salary adjustments.
First, we think that women faculty and administrators should be aware
of the implicit model of inequity processes that they hold and thus also consider the type of statistical evidence that they will accept as appropriate. We
are especially concerned that many women faculty seem to accept the definition of a negative residual as “underpayment.” Committees that take (or accept) this approach disregard the potentially underpaid women “stars” even as
they encourage men with negative residuals to define themselves also as “underpaid.” Highlighting cases with negative residuals puts the spotlight on the
women and men who are more likely than most to have lower values on the
unmeasured productivity variables. This inadvertently sets up the study to encounter a maximum of political backlash, since a focus on the low end of the
distribution risks both confirming stereotypes about women as low performers and stirring up resentment among men who feel it unjust for any “comparable” woman to be earning more than they do. Flagging (and trying to contest “justifications for”) some women’s low salaries also does not even begin to
address the “glass ceiling” for women achievers. When gaining and maintaining the strong support of the most respected women faculty on campus may
be key for reaching a resolution politically, disregarding the pay problems that
can affect “above average” women is strategically unwise as well as theoretically unsound.
Theoretically, we think that salary equity committees should consider not
just the main effects for gender but also the shape of the residuals as important
clues to processes of individual and institutional discrimination for women at
all salary levels. We do not doubt that there are instances where concentrated
animosity toward women may lead to a cluster of especially underpaid women
at the bottom (evidenced in the long negative “tail” or second “hump” in the
distribution), but unspoken norms about women not earning more than men
of their cohort may also produce a “truncated top” that holds back the salaries of the women who excel. It is a pattern of negative residuals, not the negative residual of any individual, that should guide a committee’s interpretation
of inequity. If such a pattern is found, then the committee should be attentive
to individual cases that may represent inequitable pay but appear anywhere in
the distribution. For example, if there is a prejudiced administrator in a specific
department, the exceptionally low salaries of some women in that department
should trigger a review of all women’s salaries in that department, not just of
the ones that show exceptionally large negative residuals.
Second, we encourage applied researchers to be aware of and explicit about
the theory—and the politics—of the models they employ (cf. Acker 1989; Steinberg 1995). The power that administrators hold over salary setting, especially
on nonunion campuses, means that the administration’s conception of discrimination is often definitive. It may be necessary to provide evidence that is structured to fit in their implicit model in order to create any acknowledgment that
“a problem” may exist. Making compromises to meet their concerns can lead to
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a more satisfactory outcome over the long run. In our case study, a “quick victory” in the form of an across-the-board increase might not have had the consciousness and policy-changing effects in both faculty and administration that
a longer negotiating process produced. Indeed, on the unionized campus that
provided the initial model for our study, the salary awards were made without fanfare and salary setting continued as usual. Despite the across-the-board
awards that were won in 1988, it would not surprise us to find salary inequities
there again in 1998. Paradoxically, institutional change may demand engagement with just those administrators who do not hold an institutional model of
discrimination processes.
Understanding the administration’s perspective helped to reach such a longterm resolution. Administrators who think discrimination is rare may be more
concerned that an across-the-board settlement will “unfairly reward” a woman
who happens not to be underpaid (Type II error) than that their focus on “flagging” negative residuals will miss correcting problems for women who have
smaller-than-appropriate positive residuals (Type I error). Administrators’ definition of the relative importance of Type I versus Type II error is theoretical
rather than empirical, resting at its root on a conviction that salary discrimination is rare rather than typical. Extensively working with the administration on
a great number of individual “flagging” models may help to make discrimination seem less rare and contribute to their willingness to consider across-theboard increases (as it did in our case study).
Concern about giving “undeserved” increases to women may also reflect a
more deeply felt concern about an “unjust advantage” for women than for the
“unjust advantages” of men over the years. Haignere et al. (1996, 88) recount a
case in which, as a result of a salary settlement, a woman was to receive $300
more per year than a man who was admittedly her equal: this was felt as a
gross injustice. The underpayment she had faced over the previous six years
was $7,800. At that rate, however, the advantage would have to persist for 26
years for her to simply earn back the amount she had been underpaid. Greater
concern with women earning more than men than the reverse represents exactly the sort of “built-in bias” in the system that the concept of institutional
discrimination was created to cover (Major 1989). Trying to eliminate institutional discrimination in salary-setting means confronting such “nonhostile” biases against women, which may demand campus-wide discussions.
Making clear the implicit theories of discrimination operating on both sides
of the negotiating process can improve understanding and appreciation for the
opposing statistical approaches, and this in turn may help reach a resolution.
While the administration may not be willing to change its model, the women
faculty may be less easily diverted to “fixing” just a few individuals and the
men faculty may be more willing to support them over what is likely to be a
lengthy struggle. Statistical experts should not attempt to fool their clients (or
themselves) into thinking that theirs is an atheoretical effort to merely find
the best-fitting regression model, but they should show how both types of approaches to even the same regression are tests of theory. The applied researcher
thus can (and under some circumstances, should) test both competing theories

Methodological

and

Policy Issues

in

University Salary Studies

35

and try to explain the strengths and weaknesses of each, including the implications of institutional analysis for remedies.
On one hand, using the institutional approach makes it possible to show
when discrimination is a systematic pattern and allows for exploration of what
kind of pattern it is by examining main effects, interactions, and residuals. The
policy-capturing approach itself can increase administrators’ awareness of how
much certain factors contribute to basic salary-setting decisions and can lead
to efforts to make policy more explicit and more fair in principle. On the other
hand, using the flagging approach can confront administrators with evidence
they find compelling about some individual women, including some instances
of gross underpayment well in excess of institutional patterns. In addition, by
focusing attention on the small groups in which salaries are actually negotiated, the model may lead administrators to reflect more on how salaries are
bargained and be more aware of the need for clearer and more uniform salarysetting policies at the institution.
Overall, we think that looking at institutional as well as individual patterns
of discrimination is useful in achieving more than short-term salary adjustments. If the pattern of women’s underpayment is not going to simply be reestablished by a return to ordinary, nonhostile practices with discriminatory effect, these practices will need to be identified and discussed institutionally. For
example, the common institutional practice of expecting talented high achievers to get competing outside offers to demonstrate their value to their home institution may disadvantage women in that they are more likely than men on
the faculty to be married to another faculty member and thus less credible as
seriously contemplating a move, making it harder to get outside offers and less
likely that such offers will be aggressively matched (Haignere et al. 1996). Such
“business-as-usual” approaches simply retain the organizational norms constructed based on professional men’s life patterns of the 1950s (Acker 1989).
Taking both types of statistical models to their limits may push both parties
to begin to discuss such assumptions and identify the problems both types of
discrimination may cause. Even this, however, still leaves a distance to go in
constructing the political dialogue that will enable academic institutions to acknowledge and overcome their biases.

Notes
1. The empirical model presented here has many limits, and is not offered as evidence of
discrimination, whether illegal or not. The analysis only provides an example of what the
model and the output might look like using this approach.
2. Pay and promotion reflect different institutional processes. They are often set by different
decision makers (in the case of promotion, the support of the full professors of the department may be required, while pay increases may be given by department heads, deans, or
higher administrators), using different criteria (the “merit” assessed for pay may more
readily include administrative service or teaching, while promotion may focus narrowly
on scholarship), and standards of fairness (raises may reflect ideas about inflation, family
size, or income demands while promotions do not). Thus it should not be surprising that
discrimination in each might vary independently.
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3. In regressions, the residual is the difference between the actual and the predicted salary.
In sample-based studies, such residuals also represent sampling error. Since salary studies use a full population rather than a sample, the residual is unexplained variance that
represents some real but unmeasured process by which salaries are set, even if it is sheer
caprice (chance).
4. Following this logic, the institutional norm for female-sex-typed occupations would be
the women’s salaries, and in these instances the men’s data should be fitted to the women’s model.
5. This could also appear as a clustering of women just at the most extreme low end of the
distribution, producing a long “tail” there, if all the affected women were very extremely
underpaid. It is more likely, however, that the center of the separate distribution of “underpaid women” falls somewhere above the lowest point of the distribution of “fairly
paid women” even when there are two separate underlying distributions so that the two
groups cannot be separated by statistical means alone. The overlap of the two underlying
distributions is what generates the observed bimodality.
6. At its worst extreme, this approach eschews statistics entirely, selecting one individual
“similarly situated” man to compare to each woman.
7. Unfortunately, some of those who adopt the institutional approach also fall into the trap
of confusing the negative residual itself with “underpayment” and simply interpret a regression performed on the entire institution in the same way we discuss for the small
group regressions. It is no less a problem in this instance.
8. To be precise, the second author was hired and the administration paid her very modest
consulting fees.
9. This study, briefly described in Geetter (1988), was conducted by a joint administration-union team as mandated in the previous collective bargaining contract. There had
been nearly a decade of negotiations (between women faculty and the union, between
the union and the administration, and between the statewide coalition of state employee
unions and the state legislature) that made possible both the study and its relatively rapid
translation into salary inequity awards.
10. Using logs lessens the gap between the mean and the high end of the distribution and is
often warranted when distributions are very skewed, with a long high-end tail. But in this
instance, the “superstars” who formed the high-end tail were removed and the remaining
distribution not particularly skewed.
11. Measurement error in the independent variables can also contribute to the spread of
the residuals, but most of the variables in this model are relatively straightforward (similar to demographic indicators), such as age, department, rank, type of appointment, and
so forth, which tend to have less measurement error than indicators of more abstract constructs. “Error” in the dependent variable is not measurement error (the measured salaries represent what base pay the faculty actually received) but may represent variation
that is due to unmeasured but systematic causes (what we are calling productivity) or unmeasured, unsystematic causes (what can be called chance or caprice); we assume the latter is negligible and inseparably confounded with real productivity in legitimate salary
decision-making.
12. There was also disagreement regarding how to group individuals. The original committee chose task similarities and based the groups on different departments. We accepted
the limitation of the data (human resources did not list specialties within departments)
and attempted to group individuals by department types. We consciously chose not to
use market force groupings (groupings based on published data that grouped individuals based on similar pay ranges for type of work performed) because of gender bias in the
market that differentially rewards different types of employment (comparable worth issues). Even the committee’s task-based departmental grouping confounds similarity of
task with proportion female in the departments (e.g., by grouping pediatric departments
together). However, administration was very aware of how market forces influence salary setting and felt it was not fair to penalize one institution that is at the mercy of worldwide market forces. Thus, the administration considered the original model inadequate
because it did not use market forces to group faculty. Ultimately the later committee and
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the administration agreed to use published salary data to group individuals by medical
specialty regardless of departmental affiliation. With considerable help from the administration, we were able to get this specialty information for all employees and to add it to
the personnel data.
13. When values of measure are arbitrary (as in a 0/1 dummy variable for gender), the difference in slopes between the two models implies a different intercept as well (the distance between two nonparallel lines will vary depending on where the y-axis is set).
14. In fact, some differences (those due to race and age particularly) are also illegal and illegitimate, but for the purposes of assessing gender-based inequities, they need to be examined separately (that is, statistically controlled), as well as examined for interaction effects
with gender (none was significant).
15. Gray (1990) considers a model explaining more than 70 percent of the variance to be acceptable, in that the size of the gap is not being inflated by a generally poor specification
of the variables. Although the specific number is only an arbitrary convention, like the .05
level for statistical significance, it reflects a general principle of seeking a good fit before
turning to examination of the residual.
16. In fact, Hauser recommends only running the regression with gender as a variable, but
although this method is subsumed in ours, it is less useful because it provides no information to examine the nature of the average difference, as the analysis of residuals does.
17. This small group/individual prejudice approach is also closer to the way variables are
controlled in experimental designs (Campbell and Stanley 1963) and also may appeal to
physicians and other clinical researchers for this reason. The earlier studies at the Health
Center that faculty women carried out also tended to employ comparison grouping and
analysis of variance rather than multivariate statistical controls.
18. The data for setting market-based values on departments were drawn from the American Association of Medical Colleges Report on Medical School Faculty Salaries (Smith,
1993-1994) and the American Association of Dental Schools (i993-1994) Faculty Salary
Survey.
19. These figures reflect all of the adjustments made up to this point, not just those recommended by the joint council.
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